Technical Appendix
(Expanded proofs, not intended for publication)
The following lemma is used repeatedly in the paper. This lemma was first proven in the generality shown here by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) ; however, special cases were used by several authors, notably Myerson (1981) prior to this. Subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
Moreover, (A2) and (A3) (A1).
, 
Q.E.D.
As part of Theorem 1, we obtain the expressions (3) and (4) 
and substitute to get (4):
which is the result stated.
THEOREM 2: There is a unique number firms, m, which is efficient for entry in the tournament and entry of the m lowest-cost firms is an equilibrium.
Proof:
Note that γ γ
. Thus, if it is unprofitable for firm k to enter, it is unprofitable for firm k+1 to enter, showing the equilibrium m is uniquely determined.
Q.E.D. ( )
The optimal entry fee with m participants is:
which are the profits of the m th highest firm. The total cost of procurement with m participants is: ... 
.. 
is increasing, then any equilibrium is inefficient which was the conclusion of Section III.
Section IV.
First we will show there is no differentiable pure-strategy bidding equilibrium for the uniformprice auction when contestants differ in starting values and have no opportunity for further research following entry. If we define "y" to be the cutoff starting value of the (M+1)st firm, the probability firm i wins the prize, given entry is our equation (7). A firm holding starting innovation x i that bids as if it held innovovation r would expect a profit equal to: The first order conditions for a maximum require π 1 ( , )
: In both cases, evaluating at r = x i gives us: π 1 ( , ) 
In contrast, the firm holding x max wins the tournament with probability: [ ]
To see that the term in the square brackets is positive, note that it comes in the form: [ ]
which is the result we sought to prove.
Q.E.D.
Now we will derive the equations and conditions which characterize the profits of these firms as represented by [Graph 1] in the paper.
Define u m to be the solution to: 1 − + u mu u log in (0,1). This solution is unique. 
∂ π ∂
Note that the denominator is positive since 
However, using the quotient rule for differentiating, since the denominator is squared we know: 
2 2 2 1 1 0 {since 1 − + u u u log is zero at u = 1 and is decreasing for u ∈ (0,1) } Therefore, when u ∈ (0,1) then ~( )
Thus, (note we are reversing the inequalities now) a sufficient condition for Proof: Previously we showed that if firms are not allowed to conduct research following entry then the only possible pure-strategy bidding equilibrium is for all firms to bid 0, which is not an equilibrium.
When firms are allowed to conduct research following entry, LEMMA 4 tells us that Z=0 IFF The first order conditions for this expression suggest the only possible equilibrium for this uniform-price entry auction is the bidding function: B w w w
π . This implies that firms must bid their expected profits given entry in the tournament, assuming they will have the smallest endowment of w of all the entrants. But the
0 w such that ∀ w < w , π ( , ) w w ≥ π (~,~) w w , implies this bid is either decreasing for w sufficiently close to w , or is constant for all w < w . Therefore a symmetric, increasing, pure-strategy bidding equilibrium cannot exist. In the discriminatory price auction, the first order conditions give: 
Q.E.D.
Now, using expectation notation we will make the connection between our findings in Theorem 5 and our results from Section III and Section IV.
Let the w be independently distributed with cdf H(w) and density h(w). There are m firms that gain entry and by assumption we have it that w i is the smallest w of all entrants, implying that all entrants can be said to have been drawn independently from the modified distribution of Q.E.D.
